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Thursday, October 28, 2010

"What it means for people to be citizens" - Report of Salon with Gavan McCormack 「市民」たることとは―ガバン・マコーマックさんを迎えてのサロン 報告


"What it means for people to be citizens"


- Report of Fall Special Peace Philosophy Salon with Gavan McCormack

Thank you for sharing the special evening with Gavan McCormack on October 16, to those twenty-five or so adults and several children, at the fall special Peace Philosophy Salon, "Battle of Okinawa 2010: Japan-US Relations at a Crossroad." Gavan, based in Canberra, Australia, a dedicated scholar on Japan and East Asia the last five decades, author of numerous books including Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (2007), paid a special visit to Vancouver and Victoria, after giving a talk at Portland State University in Oregon. He gave two talks at the University of Victoria on October 18, and our Salon was the only event in Vancouver, so those of us who were there that night were very fortunate.

Gavan talked  about the Cold War assumption and security structure that still underpins the Japan-US relation, supported the "client-state" mentality that still persists in the Japanese government; the failed attempt to change that structure by Hatoyama and DPJ government after the historic regime change of 2009; concern over the "deepening alliance" between the two countries in the 50th anniversary of the revision of ANPO (Japan-US Security Treaty), and Okinawans' 14-year resistance against the two governments' attempt to replace the obsolete and dangerous MCAS Futenma with a new, upgraded Marine airbase and military port in Henoko/Oura-Bay, an eco-sensitive area in Northeastern shore of the island. "There is no precedent in modern Japanese history for an entire prefecture to unite, as does Okinawa today, in saying 'No' to the central state authorities," Gavan emphasizes as he talked about the ever strong opposition to the new base within Okinawa. "Okinawa’s history over especially the past 14 years constitutes a lesson to the rest of Japan in what it means for people to be citizens." There is much to ponder on this statement.


Gavan also touched upon the debate over the ship collision incident near the group of islets and rocks, called "Diaoyu" 釣魚 in Chinese and "Senkaku" 尖閣 in Japanese. We will summarize on that part of the talk later on.

Here are comments from the participants. 
"The evening with Professor Gavan McCormack was an intellectually stimulating and engaging event that was also timely with subject matter of immense current importance.  It was great to basically have a full lecture by Gavan on the issue of the disputes over the Okinawan bases, particularly Henoko, and also the contestation between Japan and China over Senkaku Island (as called by Japan).  The talk showed the relevance of these issues to local people caught up in larger global processes, as well as its importance to Asia and the world more generally.  It was good to see so many people interested enough to come out for this event on a Saturday night, and to see many familiar faces.  While interfacing with Gavan on the issues, it allowed a sense of intimacy even though there were a large number of people who came, and a chance for more informal interaction as well.  I particularly appreciated the inclusion of the environmental issues and the effects on life forms on the islands or waters surrounding them, which is less often reported in press accounts, but also of major importance." - Millie Creighton

"The talk from 'citizen' Gavan McCormack is extremely rich in knowledge, reasoning and wisdom. The question he raised on the double standard of citizen democratic movements--why Okinawan's non-violent demonstration was muted in North American media--brings serious challenge to the policy makers here. This dilemma is hard to justify. The question about what "Citizenship" means also touches on the fundamentals of democracy. While we studies democracies we often focus on the factual sides of the definition of citizenship, such as suffrage across gender, ethnic, social classes, etc. However, it is important to emphasize the obligation and responsibility of citizens." - Arc (Zhen) Han

"I learned a lot from Gavan's talk. What impressed me the most was Gavan's depth of his knowledge based on his research in BOTH Japanese and English material. He is a TRUE scholar who examines data and makes his OWN analysis. Unlike many academics in the field who write/borrow somebody else's interpretation and claim that they are competent in Japanese material." - Yuko Shibata

"Gavan san is an excellent scholar familiar with the Japanese history and politics. There are some other academics who may be as knowlegeable as he is, but I felt something more: 'sympathique' in him. He is an approachable person for us, non-specialists and I can see that he tries to communicate with us. As Gavan noted, the salon meeting was a good mixture of different ethnic groups and age groups. Satoko san, we should encourage him to come back again to our salon meeting." - Tatsuo Kage

"Thank you again for organizing the inspiring and engaging event with Gavan.  I really enjoyed the Q&A part in which we have very good discussion and exchange of opinion.... Frankly speaking, I am not so optimist about the relationship between China and Japan which is complicated with historical wounds and new hatred.  But I still believe people like you and me doing our parts will at least make some difference." - Thekla Lit

"For myself, the most meaningful things and what I was able to follow without a problem that Gavan was talking about were the territorial disputes between Japan and China over Senkaku/Daioyu Island. I have been following this issue and other territorial disputes with Japan. It was great to hear the discussion after the talk about this issue. I believe this issue is a major player in the future Sino-Japanese relations. It was also great to hear and have such a discussion with so many different sides speaking. It was really something unique in the sense of who came to the gathering. There were both sides represented in the discussion and then Gavan was like the mediator. It was also very enlightening to here about Okinawa and the idea of saving Article 9 and the Futenma military base issue." - Aaron Lev

"Thank you very much for organizing such an interesting event at your beautiful salon. An idea of striving to form a collective regional community throughout Asia in terms of an alternative measure to reduce strong US influence in Japan (in particular, in relation to the issues of the Okinawa US Naval Base) was interesting. Although Japan still has the unresolved war responsibility issues with its neighbor countries, and the number of regional blocks in Asia is very few and only focued on non-political agendas, this idea seems persuasive with the fast rising of China. " - Eun-bok (Alexa) Kim  
"Thank-you very much! And thanks again for a wonderful opportunity to meet with Gavan and have a serious discussion about military bases in Okinawa. I hope the Peoples Movement in Okinawa is able to curtail the military plans of the US and Japanese governments. If so, it will have benefitted from your efforts!" - Donald Burton

For Gavan's new paper on which his talk was based, see HERE.
 
For more of Gavan's articles on Japan Focus: Asia-Pacific Journal, see HERE.
 
For the "salon host" Satoko's articles on Okinawa on Japan Focus: Asia-Pacific Journal, see HERE.

Salon Talk by Gavan McCormack on Okinawa Crisis and US-Japan Relationship ガバン・マコーマック サロントーク―沖縄・日米関係について

This is a new paper by Gavan McCormack, our guest at Peace Philosophy Salon on October 16, on which his talk was based on. Thank you Gavan for providing this text for those who could not make the event that day and for those of us who want to revisit the special evening. We will also post feedback from participants soon. 10月16日のピース・フィロソフィー・サロンのゲスト、ガバン・マコーマックさんのトークのもとになった論文を掲載します。フォーマットの関係で脚注や写真を入れることができませんでしたので、完全版(PDF)をご希望の方は info@peacephilosophy.com にご連絡ください。

Note: due to the formatting limitation on this blog, this version does not have footnotes and photos. The full PDF version can be available upon request. Contact info@peacephilosophy.com

The Battle of Okinawa 2010

Japan-US Relations at a Crossroad

Gavan McCormack

Peace Philosophy Salon, Vancouver, Canada,

16 October 2010

Five decades after the adoption of the (revised) US-Japan Security Treaty, and two decades after the end of the Cold War, Cold War assumptions still underpin the relationship between the world’s leading industrial democracies. A belated Japanese attempt to change and reform the relationship in 2009-2010 ended in failure and the collapse of the Hatoyama government. Whether the Kan government can do better remains to be seen. The relationship that I wrote about in 2007 as “Client state”-ish proves difficult to transcend. The “Okinawa problem” has emerged as a crucial bone of contention, not only between the two governments but between the people of Okinawa and both governments. This paper addresses the implications of the now 14-year long attempt to resolve the Okinawan demand for closure and return of Futenma Marine base in Ginowan City.

**** ****
Global and Regional Frame
Before addressing the Okinawa problem, let me make some general remarks on the frame within which the US-Japan relationship exists. I see the present moment as one of sharp disjuncture in East Asia between on the one hand the continuing Cold War security architecture of global bloc confrontation, nuclear weapon based and super-power centred, linking the counties of East and Southeast Asia in hub and spokes of containment or hostility towards the Soviet Union and then China, and on the other hand the rapidly growing, China-centred, economic and ecological inter-dependence. China is the world’s number two economy and for both the US and Japan the major trading partner. China is also Japan’s best prospect for future economic growth, prosperity and stability. And at an even deeper level, in terms of ecology – the fate of Japan and China is inextricably inter-twined. Climate change, global warming, species loss, resource depletion, desertification, collapse of the oceans affect both. For better or for worse, the two countries are in the same boat, and they must row together.

Japan – not alone but anyway critically, is caught in the contradiction between the economic base and the military and political superstructure. According to Karl Marx, there is only one way that, in the long term, such contradictions will be resolved. In these coming decades, short of some currently unforeseeable catastrophe, the US global weight will diminish and China (of course not just China but Asia as a whole) will resume the roughly half of global GDP it represented two centuries ago. The American century ends, the Chinese century begins (or rather another, since there have been many in the past.) The security structures are anachronistic and out of kilter with the burgeoning economic and ecological aspects of this conflicted world order.

65 years since its defeat in war, and just under 60 since it recovered its independence Japan remains occupied by its former conqueror under the US-Japan Security treaty. Yokosuka is home port for the 7th Fleet and Sasebo a major secondary facility for the US Navy, Misawa in Hokkaido and Kadena in Okinawa are key assets for the USAF, as to the Marine Corps are Camps Kinser, Foster, Futenma, Schwab in Okinawa and Iwakuni in Yamaguchi prefecture. Scattered throughout Japan are the housing, hospitals, hotels, golf courses (two in Tokyo alone) and other facilities that combine to make some believe that,

“As a strategic base, the Japanese islands buttress half of the globe, from Hawaii to the Cape of Good Hope. If the US were to lose Japan, it could no longer remain a superpower with a leadership position in the world.”

Especially in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the US has pressed Japan to make the relationship into a “mature” alliance by removing barriers to joining the US in war as in peace.

It is not just the continuation of US occupation and the incorporation of Japan in its global military strategy that is anomalous, but the fact that Japan insists on paying generously to subsidize it. The Japan whose constitution outlaws “the threat or use of force in international affairs” is allied to the one country above all others for whom war and the threat of war are key instruments of policy. It supports US wars in every possible way short of actually sending troops, offers it more extensive military facilities, supports it (and its wars) with more generous subsidies than any other country (at around $5 billion per year).

I have described this Japan as a Client State (Zokkoku). I define “Client State” as one that chooses dependence. Japan chooses to be occupied, is determined at all costs to avoid offence to the occupiers, to pay whatever price necessary to be sure that the occupation continue, and meticulous in adopting and pursuing policies that will satisfy its occupier. As one Japanese scholar puts it, for the bureaucrats who guide the Japanese state,

“‘servitude’ is no longer just a necessary means but is happily embraced and borne. ‘Spontaneous freedom’ becomes indistinguishable from ‘spontaneous servitude’.”

The problems of Japan and East Asia are rooted in this self-abnegation at the heart of the Japanese state. As little as three years ago, when my book was published the term Zokkoku (the Japanese title) had a certain shock effect. I expected to be criticized for hyperbole for using it, but to my surprise it has steadily become uncontroversial, adopted even by prominent Japanese conservatives. How can it be, I ask myself, that such an ignominious status could so long be tolerated by a people for whom in the past nationalism has been so dear? The Japan once troubled by ultra-nationalism, now lapses into negative, or compensatory nationalism.

Clientilism is of course not unique to Japan, nor is it necessarily irrational. Dependence and subordination during the Cold War brought Japan considerable benefits, especially economic. But that era ended, and instead of gradually reducing the US military footprint in Japan and Okinawa as the “enemy” vanished, the US ramped it up. It pressed Japan’s Self Defence Forces to cease being “boy scouts” (as Donald Rumsfeld once contemptuously called them) and to become a “normal” army, and to step up its contribution to the “war on terror.” “Client State” status came to require heavier burdens and greater costs than during the Cold War, but it offered reduced benefits and enmeshed Japan more inextricably in the contradiction between its economic and ecological shared destiny with China and its security dependence on the US. The dilemma sharpens as US global power and influence decline.

Okinawa – Periphery and Centre
For the most part, the Zokkoku relationship remains comfortable enough for people in mainland Japan, because it impinges little on everyday life. But clientilism and the Japanese state priority to military ties to the US weigh heavily on the people of Okinawa, and resistance to that agenda is strongest there. In Okinawa, three-quarters of all US military facilities in Japan are concentrated: 29 separate facilities, taking up 20 percent of the land area of the main island. In mainland Japan, no new base has been built since the 1950s, but in Okinawa for the past 14 years the Government of Japan has been committed to building a new base for the Marine Corps. It is described as a “replacement” for the obsolescent and inconvenient Futenma that sits in the middle of Ginowan township, but it is far more than Futenma. What is planned is a vast, sophisticated military complex at Henoko, far more multi-functional than Futenma (and including a deep-sea port for docking nuclear submarines). This relatively remote northern Okinawa site has become the “hottest” land and sea district in all Japan.

Okinawa, as Ryukyu, was part of the East Asian, China centered, world long before it became part, first of the pre-modern and then of the modern Japanese state. Flourishing as an independent commercial and cultural centre in the 15th and 16th centuries, it was invaded and reduced to semi-independence in 1609 and then fully incorporated in modern Japan in 1879, following diplomatic blunders by a weakened China that allowed its claims to sovereignty to lapse.

After 1945, whether under direct US military rule to 1972, or nominal Japanese rule after it, Okinawa’s orientation to war did not change. It played a key role in the conduct of wars from Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1961-75), Gulf (1990), to Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003 -). In the context of 21st century shift from a US-centered world order to a possibly China-centred one, the fact that the Okinawan islands stretch through the East China Sea, not far from the coast of China, for around 1,000 kilometers, gives them a potentially huge military significance, especially in the hands of a military force hostile to or set on containing China.

The Hatoyama Attempted Revolt
During the prolonged one party state system in Japan between 1955 and 2009, a thoroughly ramified “Client State” system evolved in which priority to US interests was taken for granted, intil 30 August 2009, when Hatoyama Yukio and the DPJ came to power in a dramatic shift, signaling the bankruptcy of the old regime and the search for a new order.

Hatoyama had a vision for Japan. Like Obama a little earlier, he tapped a national mood of desire for change, a Japan beyond client state-ism (Japanese: Zokkoku). He promised to renegotiate the relationship with the US on the basis of equality; to reject “market fundamentalism” and to re-orient Japan away from US-centred unipolarism towards a multipolar world in which Japan would be a central member of an East Asian community, built around a core value of “Yuai,” which he described as something that was “...a strong, combative concept that is a banner of revolution,” using the word “revolution” in a way no Japanese Prime Minister had ever used it before. He opened the Diet session in January 2010 with the words.

“I want to protect people’s lives.

That is my wish: to protect people’s lives

I want to protect the lives of those who are born; of those who grow up and mature…”

Such pronouncements disturbed Washington. Hatoyama was dismissed as a weirdo. What leader of government ever spoke of an “equal” relationship with the United States, something never contemplated and almost unimaginable; or of “protecting life?” But it was in particular Hatoyama’s attempt to renegotiate the agreements adopted by previous, conservative governments to build the new base at Henoko where he crossed a line.

Dismissing Hatoyama’s vision and ignoring his policies and projects ignored, US President Obama refused even to meet him to discuss his agenda or his vision. The US Departments of State and Defense delivered him ultimatum after ultimatum, telling him that they would not reopen negotiations, and that it would be a “blow to trust” between the two countries if the existing agreement (on Henoko) could not be implemented.

When Hatoyama announced (December 2009) that he would postpone the crucial decision till May 2010, Pentagon Press Secretary (Geoff Morell) declared that the US “did not accept” the Japanese decision; Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, said the Japanese public would have to understand the need to keep US forces in Okinawa. The Washington Post described Hatoyama as “the biggest loser [among world leaders]…, hapless, … increasingly loopy,” i.e., in effect, it was saying, Hatoyama was mad.

In short, the newly installed Hatoyama government faced orders from Washington to fulfill the pledge signed and railroaded through the Diet in the dying days of Aso Taro’s LDP government. The abuse and intimidation to which Hatoyama was subject is without precedent in the US relationship with any country, including Iran and North Korea, let alone its supposed closest of allies.

Torn between the pressures of Washington on the one hand and Okinawa on the other, hemmed in by faithless bureaucrats in Tokyo intent on subverting his agenda, Hatoyama’s political position crumbled. The national media blamed him for the deterioration in the country’s key relationship, insisting that he cease offending and irritating the US. In the 50th year of the Ampo relationship, it became clear that in a “mature” alliance a Japanese government could not survive loss of Washington’s confidence. Obama, having risen to power in his own country promising “change,” forbade it in Japan. A client state is not allowed to be uppity. The distinguished Tokyo University political scientist, Shinohara Hajime, recently said that he regarded the 28 may agreement between Hatoyama and the US government as Japan’s (second defeat” (daini no haisen), i.e. tantamount to August 1945.

When Hatoyama in due course surrendered, he abandoned or betrayed the hopes of change raised by the DPJ before it took office. He also gave up other core elements of his vision. His “East Asian Community” mysteriously transmuted into something that would include the US (and would therefore be unacceptable to China), and the “China threat” had moved closer to the centre of defense and security policy.

The Hatoyama government’s fall is best seen as a client state crisis: a failed attempt to move from dependency to equality. It demonstrated the abjectness of Japan’s submission and revealed in bold relief just what, in its mature, 21st century form, a client state was.

Kan Government, June 2010-
When Kan Naoto took the reins of government in early June, the national media defined his key task as being to heal the “wounds” that Hatoyama had caused to the alliance, restore Washington’s trust and confidence in Japan, and resolve the Okinawa problem by “persuading” Okinawa to accept the new base. Kan’s first act as Prime Minister was to telephone US President Obama to assure him he would do what was required. When in his introductory policy speech to the Diet he pledged the “steady deepening of the alliance relationship” that was what he meant.

Just four months into the Kan government, however, nothing has been resolved. Under the Agreement that Hatoyama signed on 28 May, the details of the new base construction were to be settled by the end of August, but in August the deadline was extended to November. The two sides could not agree on what shape the new base would have (“V” or “I” shaped), where exactly it would be built, how it would be constructed, what would be the flight path for its aircraft, and whether Japan’s Self Defense Forces could share its use. Only in September did the US government make public its intention to deploy at the new base the MV22 Osprey VTOL aircraft, capable, with refueling, of a range of 3,700 kilometres or around five times that of the CH46 helicopters that currently operate from Futenma This had major implications for the levels of noise and risk that adjacent communities could expect to experience and it constituted yet another reason for reopening the environmental assessment process.

Okinawa – The Resistance
What governments in Tokyo and Washington could not accept is that there is no way to persuade or compel a determinedly hostile Okinawa to submit. Time and again, from 1996 to today, Tokyo has declared its determination to substitute a Henoko base for the Futenma one, and time and again Okinawa has resisted and forced it to back down. The Okinawan people have resolved by every conceivable means – elections, resolutions (of local Assemblies including the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and Nago City Assembly), mass “All-Okinawa” meetings, opinion surveys, statements by officials) that it not be built. This fierce, uncompromising, non-violent, popularly-supported Okinawan resistance has been one of the most remarkable features of recent Japanese history. If this Okinawan resistance had been in a country out of favour with the US and Japan it would have won global acclaim as a heroic expression of popular will, a beacon of courageous, democratic determination, but because the struggle is against two supposed pillars of the global democratic system, such recognition is denied it.

The International Year of Biodiversity
This year, 2010, has been declared by the United Nations to be the “International Year of Biodiversity.” This very month, October, the parties to COP 10, the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity, meet in Nagoya. It is incongruous that the government that hosts the Nagoya meeting should be committed to imposing a massive military base upon one of its (and the world’s) most precious concentrations of biodiversity.

The coastal areas of Henoko (where the base would be constructed) are classified under the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s Guidelines for Environmental Protection as rank 1, warranting the highest level of protection. There the internationally protected dugong graze on sea grasses, turtles come to rest and lay their eggs, and multiple rare birds, fish, crustaceans, insects, and animals thrive.

A colony of blue coral was discovered only in 2007 (and in 2008 placed on the IUCN’s “Red,” or critically endangered, list); a 2009 World Wildlife Fund study found an astonishing 36 new species of crabs and shrimps; in July 2010 Tokyo marine science researchers found 182 different species of sea grasses and marine plants, four of which were probably new species; and just weeks ago, the Nature Conservation Society of Japan found 362 species of conchs in those same waters, 186 of them in one 50-centimeter-square area. This sea is a concentrated marine patch of Brazilian rain-forest.

The construction process (for the “V” version) would require 21 million cubic metres of fill, of which 17 million cubic metres would be sea sand. That means a staggering 3.4 million dump truck loads of sand, more than 12 times the current volume of sand extracted in a year from throughout Okinawa. That alone, before actual base construction could begin, would mean significant damage to Okinawa’s fragile land and sea environment.

Along with the dugong, turtles and other creatures, for the US Marine Corps and their Japanese promoters the coral of Oura bay is simply a nuisance. When the first plans for militarizing the Bay were developed, in 1962, the Marine Corps began to deal with the coral by bombing it. Such a course is not open today, but the scale of militarization envisaged could be expected to have the same effect over the longer term.

It is true that an environmental impact study was conducted on Henoko between 2007 and 2009. But the Assessment Law (Asesuho) does not stipulate an impartial, scientific process and includes no provision for actually banning a project on environmental grounds. It merely requires the party proposing works to consider their impact and take appropriate steps to protect the environment. So the Japanese Defence Facilities Bureau (part of what was then the Defence Agency and is now the Ministry of Defence) reviewed its own project. It paid no attention to the likely impact of typhoons, because none happened while the survey was in process; it concluded that “dugong are not in the area” since it saw none, though it was likely that the dugong were not to be seen precisely because the disturbances caused by the investigation process had driven them away. The process was also flawed in that no information was provided to it on the kinds or number of aircraft that would be using the facility, or the materials that would be stored or used on it.

Okinawa Prefecture (its Environmental Impact Committee) found multiple faults in the Assessment’s Interim Report; Governor Nakaima recommended a multi-year study of the dugong, and Okinawa’s leading environmental law authority, former Okinawa University president Sakurai Kunitoshi, declared the process “unscientific” and fatally flawed. In the International Year of Biodiversity, it was bizarre, he noted, that the Government of Japan, even while hosting COP10, should go to such lengths, and spend such amounts of taxpayer money, to push through a thoroughly unscientific justification for the destruction of such a precious concentration of biodiversity.

Civic and international organizations protest the implausibility of the region’s largest military base being imposed on an environment whose extraordinary biodiversity is only slowly being understood, and court actions challenging the project on environmental grounds are underway in both the US and Japan. : It is as if the Grand Canyon were to be designated a military base, or in Australia, Kakadu.

Conclusion
The Henoko dispute compounds elements of local (Nago City), regional (Okinawan), national (Japan) and international (Japan-US) contradictions. It exposes the fabric of the Zokkoku state and the “alliance” that under-pins it and, as it continues, it threatens to widen into a movement to question the US base presence in Japan as a whole. As Kent Calder notes, the phenomenon of foreign military bases being hosted for any period of time in the territory of a sovereign state is extremely unusual; “castles built on sand” cannot long be stable. The Okinawan sand is now crumbling.

There is no precedent for the confrontation that occurred between the US and Japan in 2009-10. There is also no precedent in modern Japanese history for an entire prefecture to unite, as does Okinawa today, in saying “No” to the central state authorities. Okinawa is commonly thought of as a peripheral Japanese prefecture, but is central to Japanese, regional, and global affairs.

The legal justification for the bases, in mainland Japan as in Okinawa, is the 1960 “Japan-US Security Treaty. That treaty, however, entitles the US (under Article 6) to station troops in Japan for “the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” The Marines, however, are not a defensive, Far Eastern, force but an expeditionary “attack” force, dispatched repeatedly since 1990 for participation in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars, and held in readiness to be launched as a ground force into enemy territory. As a senior official in the Japanese Department of Defense put it, the 3rd Marine Division is a “force for deployment at any time to particular regions beyond Japan …. not for the defense of particular regions.” Their presence, supposedly justified by the security treaty, might instead be in breach of it. The base project on which the two governments have been intent since 1996 is concerned not with a Futenma substitute, or even with the defense of Japan, but on supplying the US Marine Corps with a new, upgraded, multi-service facility to be used as a forward base capable of attacking foreign territories.

Furthermore, the hullabaloo in Japan surrounding the Henoko project rests on a serious misunderstanding (if not a deliberate deception on the part of the two governments). The Pentagon from 2006 has been committed to transfer core Futenma Marine units to Guam, upgrading it into the military fortress and strategic staging post covering the whole of East Asia and the Western Pacific. That plan clearly undercuts the strategic importance of both existing and future planned marine deployments in Okinawa.

In the year of the “golden jubilee” anniversary of the US-Japan security relationship (1960), a more unequal, misrepresented and misunderstood bilateral relationship between two modern states would be difficult to imagine. Under republican and democrat administrations in the US, and LDP and DPJ governments in Japan, agreement follows agreement, postponement follows postponement, but nothing is resolved. As failure follows upon failure, that in turn feeds irritation on both sides. The Okinawan resistance constitutes a brick wall that the two governments can neither evade nor breach. In a dictatorship, the base project could still proceed, even if people had to be cleared away by tanks. That is how bases were built and expanded in the 1950s, the process that Okinawans remember bitterly as the terror of bayonets and bulldozers. But in 21st century Japan, at least so long as democratic institutions survive, it is surely beyond the capacity of any government to repeat that process.

To both sides, Okinawans are an inconvenience and a nuisance, to be persuaded or bought off with the appropriate package of carrots and sticks. Yet no defence of democracy or of a “free” world can rest on denial of freedom and democracy in a core territory. Serious attempt to resolve the “Okinawa problem” has to begin from setting aside the series of “Agreements” to militarize Oura Bay reached during the high tide of LDP client state-ish rule and putting an end to the many vain attempts to impose upon Okinawa something its people had said in every conceivable forum that they will not accept. To begin to resolve the current “Okinawa problem” means to revisit the formula on which the post-war Japanese state has rested and to begin renegotiating its dependence on the United States, to return to the Hatoyama vision of 2009 that was treated with such contempt in Washington.

Okinawa’s history over especially the past 14 years constitutes a lesson to the rest of Japan in what it means for people to be citizens and therefore to exercise with confidence and determination the sovereignty vested in them under the constitution; to hold peace dear and be resolved never to forget or repeat the crimes of militarism; to be committed to non-threatening cooperation with neighbors; to revere nature and insist on policies of environmental sustainability. The most interesting story of early 21st century Japan is being told here. Japan’s geographical periphery is its political core, pointing towards an alternative, non-client state, civil society-led, direction for the rest of the country.


Gavan McCormack is a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, and author of many previous texts on Okinawa-related matters. His Client State: Japan in the American Embrace was published in English (New York: Verso) in 2007 and in expanded and revised Japanese, Korean, and Chinese versions in 2008. He is an emeritus professor of Australian National University.

Click HERE to see more articles by Gavan McCormack on Japan Focus: Asia-Pacific Journal.






Tuesday, October 26, 2010

和田春樹「日中は尖閣島問題を対話で解決すべき」 Wada Haruki: "China-Japan, Facing Necessity to Dissolve the Conflicts over Senkaku Islands through Dialogue"

Here is the Japanese version of a column written on the disupte over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by Wada Haruki, professor emeritus of Tokyo University, "China-Japan, Facing Necessity to Dissolve the Conflicts over Senkaku Islands through Dialogue." It appeared on the October 4th issue of Kyunghyang Shinmoon, a newspaper in Korea.

See the Korean version HERE.

An English version was published on Japan Focus: Asia-Pacific Journal. Click HERE. 

韓国の京郷新聞(キョンヒャンシンムン)に連載している東大名誉教授和田春樹の尖閣諸島問題についての論考の日本語版を掲載します。

韓国語版はこちら。

英語版は『ジャパンフォーカス・アジア太平洋ジャーナル』で発表されました。リンクはこちら。


和田春樹コラム

「中国と日本、尖閣諸島問題を話し合いで解決すべき」


Wada Haruki 和田春樹 - from Kyunghyang
Shinmoon

2010年10月4日
9月7日、尖閣諸島のうちの一島久場島(くばしま)付近の東シナ海で日本の巡視船が中国のトロール漁船に退去をもとめたちところ、この漁船が巡視船と接触衝突を繰り返して逃走をはかったため、停船させ、船長を公務執行妨害容疑で逮捕した事件は大きな波紋をよび、日中関係に激震を走らせた。

尖閣諸島は日本の領土だとして、現在日本が実効支配している。だから、日本の領海内で起こった事件であるので、国内法にもとづいて「粛々と対応するだけだ」とベルリンに滞在中の岡田外相は語った。海上保安庁所属の巡視船は前原誠司国土交通大臣の監督下にある。船長逮捕が前原大臣の承認のもとに行われたことは間違いない。前原氏は中国の政策に批判をもっており、日本は毅然たる態度を示すべきだという考えをもっていた。

新聞各紙の9日の社説は、『読売新聞』が「中国人船長の逮捕は当然だ」、「尖閣諸島は、明治政府が1895年に日本の領土に編入して以来、いかなる国も異議を唱えてこなかった」と強硬であったのに、『朝日新聞』は「争いの海にせぬ知恵を」とよびかけた。「尖閣諸島は、日本が領土と定めて実効支配しているが、中国も主権を訴える敏感なところだ」という認識を示した。『毎日新聞』は「粛々と厳正な捜査を」と書いたが、「事態をエスカレートさせてはならない」とつづけた。中国も台湾も領有権を主張していると認めている。

日本は14日の民主党総裁選挙をひかえて、選挙戦の真最中であったから、政府は事態について何も考えていなかったにひとしい。新聞は中国政府が反日デモの拡大を抑えていることで安心していた様子だった。12日未明に中国の戴秉国国務委員が丹羽日本大使を深夜呼び出して抗議したことで、安心できない気分があらわれ、政府は船長をのぞく14人の釈放に踏み切った。

14日の総裁選挙で親中国とみられた小沢一郎が敗北し、菅直人が勝利した。党の人事、内閣改造に関心が向かった。岡田外相が党幹事長に就任し、後任外相には前原国土交通相が横滑りすることになった。内閣改造は17日に終わった。中国が緊張したのは明らかだった。新内閣は事態を打開する手を打つ姿勢をもたなかった。19日、船長の拘留が延長されることが発表された。拘留の延長は起訴に向かう動きを示していた。ここにおいて中国が激烈な反応を示し始めた。19日夜、閣僚級交流を停止する措置をとり、日本青年1000人を上海万博に招待することを延期した。

20日には、中国で遺棄化学兵器の撤去の仕事に参加している日本の企業の社員4名が逮捕された。そして21日には、ニューヨークに到着した温家宝首相が在米華人との会合で、「釣魚島は中国の神聖な領土である」と宣言し、船長の逮捕は「完全に違法、理不尽」だとして、直ちに無条件で釈放しなければ、中国側はあらたな行動をとる」と予告したのである。中国指導部の中でも日本に対して友好的だとみられていた温首相のこの言葉はまさに衝撃的だった。仙石官房長官は22日「大局的、戦略的な話を含めて、早急にハイ・レベルの話し合いを行いたい」と打ち上げたが、中国側から直ちに拒否された。23日には、中国政府が日本の商社関係者にハイテク商品の製造に不可欠な物資、レアアースの輸出を停止すると通告したことが明らかになった。

中国側のこの強硬な圧力の背後には、日本の国内法で船長が裁かれるという事態をなんとしても回避させたいという意思があった。船長がそのように裁かれれば、尖閣諸島は中国の領土だという主張は完全に否定され、それをはねかえすのには、あるいは軍事行動しかなくなるからであろう。さすがに菅総理、仙石官房長官は、危機の本質を見て、引き返さざるを得なかった。9月24日、那覇地方検察局は船長の釈放を発表した。

こうなって日本政府の外交のまずさを万人が語っている。ここまで来て、圧力を受けて、釈放するのなら、なぜ拘留を延長したのか、期限が切れるところで、釈放すればよかったのではないか、そもそも巡視船にぶつけてきたとしても、国外退去にしてすませるべきではなかったかというのである。しかし、日本政府の行動には、理由がある。前原大臣がくりかえし主張しているのは、日本は東シナ海に領土問題はないとみている、尖閣諸島は日本の領土であり、他国の領土主張は認めないということである。この立場からすれば、船長の逮捕、起訴、裁判は当然だということになるのである。このたびの措置がまずかったとすれば、この認識がもはや維持できないということを意味するのだと考えねばならない。

ここで、尖閣列島問題の歴史をふりかえってみよう。芹田健太郎教授の著書『日本の領土』(中央公論社、2002年)から必要な資料をうることができる。

尖閣諸島は魚釣島が最大の島で、その他七つの小さな島がある。これらの島は琉球王国が中国の册封使を迎え、朝貢使節を送る海上の道の途中にあった。一六世紀の中国の文献に「釣魚島」の名称が出てくることが確認されている。しかし、それらの記述があるからといって、これらの島の領有を主張することができるものではない。国家の領土という観念が生まれた近代において、これらの島がどのように処理されたかが大事である。日本が沖縄を正式に自国の領土としたのは1879年であったが、その後日本は与那国島の北にある無人の島、魚釣島、久米赤嶋、久馬嶋に関心を表した。1885年にはこれらの島を日本領とし、沖縄県に所属させるという提案がなされたが、中国側でも釣魚島など名前をつけている以上、一方的に領有を宣言することははばかられ、却下されたのである。

その後1890年にも、1893年にも、これらの島の領有宣言を求める提案がなされたが、そのつど見送られて、ついに1895年1月14日の閣議決定により、魚釣島と久場島の領有が宣言されるにいたったのである。この時日本は日清戦争で連戦連勝し、海城攻略戦にとりかかった時点であった。10年来躊躇してきたこれらの島の領有宣言をここでしたのは、戦争に負けつつある中国にもはや気遣う必要はなく、戦争が終われば、台湾の割譲も要求することになるのだという判断があってのことだろう。実際下関会談は3月20日からはじまり、4月1日には、台湾全島とそれに付属する澎湖列島の割譲が要求されている。魚釣島などの実効支配は台湾併合の過程の中にまざりあっていくことになった。

これらの島に新しい名称が与えられたのは1900年のことであり、沖縄師範の教師が調査した結果、「尖閣諸島」とよぶことを提案した。これが定着していくことになった。

そして、日本の敗戦後、連合軍総司令官命令で、沖縄は日本の範囲からのぞかれ、当然ながら尖閣諸島ものぞかれた。台湾が中国に返されることは明らかであり、中華民国では台湾を自国領土に編入したが、尖閣諸島を一緒に編入したという記録がないと言われる。尖閣諸島は台湾とともに中国に返されることなく、沖縄を委任統治した米軍がこれを支配した。尖閣諸島に属する二島は米軍によって射爆場として使用され続けたのである。そして、台湾には中国革命戦争にやぶれた国民党がにげこむことになり、中華民国の旗をあげた。本土には中華人民共和国の旗があがった。日本は1951年に台湾の国民党政府と日華平和条約を結んだが、尖閣諸島のことは話題にされなかった。国家の運命が明日をもしれないのだから、小さな島のことなど、国民党政府は言い出せなかっただろう。アメリカの庇護がたよりであってみれば、アメリカが使う島について文句を言える立場はなかった。

それから20年がたって、日本は北京の中華人民共和国政府と国交交渉に進もうとしていた。まさにその直前、1970年12月29日、『人民日報』が釣魚島などは「台湾同様、大昔から中国の領土である」と書くにいたったのである。71年12月30日には、中華人民共和国政府外交部が声明を出し、「釣魚島などの島嶼は昔から中国の領土である」と主張した。しかし、日中交渉は尖閣諸島問題にはいっさいふれることなく妥結して、1972年9月29日に共同声明が出され、日中国交は樹立された。日華平和条約は破棄され、日本と台湾は断交した。さらに6年後、1978年8月18日に日中平和友好条約が結ばれた。その批准書交換のため来日した鄧小平副首相は、尖閣諸島の領有権について、「中日国交正常化の際も、双方はこれに触れないことを約束した。今回の平和友好条約締結交渉の際も同じくこれに触れないことを約束した。・・・こういう問題は一時タナ上げにしてもよい。10年タナ上げにしてもかまわない」と述べたのである。

こういう経過を考えると、日本が尖閣諸島を実効支配してきたのは間違いない事実だが、ここには領土問題、領土をめぐる対立が存在することを否定することはできないことがわかる。中国側は問題をタナ上げしようとして、長い間沈黙してきたが、近年にいたり、中国の国力の飛躍的増大と海洋資源問題の重要性の高まりに合わせて、尖閣諸島に対する主張を公然化させてきたのである。南シナ海での西沙群島、南沙群島に対する領土要求が根拠あるものかどうかは知らないが、尖閣諸島については、日中間の歴史にからんで、中国の主張は微妙なニュアンスを含んでいる。

ことがここまでくれば、領土問題の存在を認めて、お互いの主張を述べあい、それを詳細に検討することが必要ではないか。絶海の無人島をお互いが「固有の領土」だと主張するのは愚かである。歴史の経過をどのように見るのが妥当なのか、議論をつくす。そして解決策を考える。その間は現実的な漁民の動きをどのようにコントロールするか、両国政府が話し合う。そういうやり方が必要である。

東北アジアには領土問題が三つある。北方4島問題、独島=竹島問題、そして尖閣諸島問題である。この三つの問題をロシア、日本、韓国、北朝鮮、中国、台湾、米国の学者を集めて、一括して議論することにしたら、どうだろうか。衝突はさけなければならない。 

Thursday, October 21, 2010

Nago City's Resolution 名護市議会の基地反対決議

名護市議決議の日本語版はここにあります。The original resolution in Japanese is at the bottom of the previous blog.
Outside the protesters's "Tent Village" in Henoko, Nago, Okinawa. The flag says, "We don't need a base, either on the land or in the ocean," the slogan by current anti-base mayor Inamine Susumu. Photo taken on July 21, 2010
 Here is an English translation of the resolution adopted by the city assembly of Nago, Okinawa, on October 15, which I reported HERE. (PeacePhilosopher)

Resolution demands retraction of Japan-U.S. agreement to relocate MCAS Futenma within Okinawa Prefecture

The Coalition Government led by former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reversed the election pledge to “relocate Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture,” and on May 28, 2010, proclaimed a Japan-U.S. Joint Statement “to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters.” It was a decision made in disregard of the will of residents of Nago and Okinawa.

Then, at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in Toronto, Canada on June 28, Prime Minister Naoto Kan confirmed his commitment to follow through on the agreement to build a replacement facility in Okinawa.

This agreement was made despite the fact that the majority of people in Nago and throughout Okinawa want the Futenma base removed outside their prefecture. It is an unacceptable act of violence, which tramples the principle of democracy, and conveys derision toward the people of Okinawa.

Adherence to election pledges and respect of the will of the people are the foundation of democracy. Hatoyama’s resignation is a vivid example of the fate of a government that tramples a public pledge and betrays the people’s will.

The people of Okinawa have shouldered the burden of military bases for sixty-five years. Seventy-four percent of the military bases designated for exclusive U.S. use are concentrated in Okinawa. Eleven percent of Nago City is occupied with U.S. military bases. Further imposition of a base burden is nothing but a discriminatory policy against the people of Okinawa.

If construction of a Futenma replacement facility proceeds in accordance with the “Japan-US agreement,” it will be evident that expansion and reinforcement of military bases will accelerate, and so will the harm associated with hosting military bases, including noise pollution and risks to security and safety of local residents.

The city assembly of Nago will not tolerate relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, based on our commitment to protect the lives and assets of our residents. With stern anger, we protest the Japan-US agreement to build a replacement base within Okinawa, which ignores the collective voice of the citizens of Nago and Okinawa, and firmly demand that the agreement be rescinded. 

We hereby resolve as above.

October 15, 2010

The Assembly of Nago City, Okinawa

To: The President of the United States, The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State




Sunday, October 17, 2010

Nago City anti-base resolution largely ignored in mainland news"papers" 名護市議会県内移設反対決議 全国紙は2紙のみ掲載


Nago City Assembly Adopts Resolution
to Oppose Henoko Base Plan - photo from Okinawa Times

According to Ryukyu Shimpo on October 17, Nago City Assembly's resolution to oppose the U.S. and Japanese governments' plan to build a new USMC base in Henoko, which was adopted on October 15, was reported on the Internet, but was largely ignored in the paper version of the mainstream media in Japan. Only Nikkei and Asahi reported it. It was useful news for those like me who only check Japanese news on the Internet. Paper versions, because of the physical limitation of space, reflect the media's priority on what and what not to report, and how. All newspapers and TV stations reported the Nago City Assembly election on September 12 widely and emphatically. How can we explain this difference? The Japanese media world have been reporting the recent dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands extremely one-sidedly from the government's argument that the Islands are "inherent" and "integral" part of the Japanese territory and there is "no territorial dispute" existing. It is apparent that the government and media are purposefully capitalizing on the incident and the nationalistic reactions to it in both Japan and China to orchestrate perceived fear and threat of China within Japan, in order to justify the construction of a new base in Okinawa. Reports on democratic voices in Okinawa therefore have been suppressed.

Nago's resolution this time is significant as it is the first time that the city's assembly opposed against construction of Futenma "replacement" base within Okinawa.

PeacePhilosopher

Below is the resolution text in Japanese.

http://www.city.nago.okinawa.jp/DAT/LIB/WEB/1/10ketsugi09.pdf

米軍普天間飛行場「県内移設の日米合意」の撤回を求める決議


去る5 月28 日、鳩山連立政権は、「最低でも県外移設」との公約を覆し、名護市民、沖縄県民の頭越しに、米軍普天間飛行場の移設先を「名護市のキャンプ・シュワブ辺野古崎地区及びこれに隣接する水域」とする日米共同声明を発表した。

その後、6月28 日にカナダのトロントで行われた日米首脳会談で菅直人首相は、日米共同声明に基づき、県内移設を約束した。

これは、県外移設を求める名護市民及び県民の意思に沿うものではなく、頭越しに行われたものであり、民主主義を踏みにじる暴挙として、また沖縄県民を愚弄するものとして到底許されるものではない。

公約の遵守と民意の尊重は政治の基本である。公約を踏みにじり、民意を裏切る政権が追い込まれることは、鳩山首相の退陣によって如実に示されている。

沖縄県内には全国の米軍専用施設の約74%が集中しており、今日まで沖縄県民は65 年以上もの間、基地負担という犠牲を強いられている。本市においても総面積の約11%を占める軍用地が存在しており、これ以上の基地負担を押し付けられることは、県民への差別的政策にほかならない。

今回の「日米合意」による普天間飛行場の辺野古への移設が進めば、基地の拡大強化と基地被害は更に増大し、これまで以上に生命の危険と騒音の被害にさらされることは明らかである。

よって、本市議会は市民の生命及び財産を守る立場から、辺野古への移設は容認できない。したがって、政府に対して名護市民、沖縄県民の総意を踏みにじる「県内移設の日米合意」に、激しい怒りを込めて抗議し、その撤回を強く求めるものである。

以上、決議する。

平成22 年10 月15 日

沖縄県名護市議会

あて先 米国大統領、駐日米国大使、米国国務長官、米国国防長官、米国国務次官補

Friday, October 15, 2010

Nago City Assembly Adopted Resolution Against Base in Henoko 名護市議会 「県内移設」反対決議


Mayor Inamine Susumu -
photo from Chugoku Shimbun
The Nago city assembly passed a resolution opposing the US and Japanese governments' plan to build a new Marine Corps base in Henoko. It is the first time since 1996 that the Nago  city assembly opposes the base plan entirely. Anti-base mayor Inamine Susumu made a statement that now that the administration and the city assembly are on a united front, they can stand up against the governmenet together more effectively.

accord+ (AP) - NAHA, Japan, Oct. 15 (Kyodo)—(EDS: ADDING FOREIGN MINISTER MAEHARA'S COMMENTS IN 5TH-6TH GRAFS)
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9IS5GK00&show_article=1



The Nago city assembly in Okinawa Prefecture adopted a resolution Friday calling on the Japanese and U.S. governments to rescind their joint statement to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to the city.
The resolution, passed by majority vote, states that the bilateral statement "goes against the wills of people in Nago and Okinawa," and condemns it as a "vicious act trampling on democracy."



Noting that U.S. military facilities already occupy about 11 percent of the city's land area, the resolution also said forcing the city to host any more U.S. military bases would be "nothing but a discriminatory policy" against people in the southwestern prefecture.



In May, the government led by then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama agreed with the United States to transfer the airfield located in a residential area in Ginowan, Okinawa, to a less-populated area in Nago, despite fierce local opposition.



Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara said at a press conference later in the day that the government "takes seriously" the Nago assembly resolution but will continue to seek the understanding of people in Okinawa to implement the May accord with the United States.



Maehara said the Japan-U.S. agreement stipulates the return of most of the military-occupied land areas south of the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa if the Futenma facility is transferred in line with the accord, and that he believes base-hosting burdens on residents in the prefecture as a whole will be alleviated.



Also on Friday, the assembly approved a petition asking the U.S. government to retract a plan to deploy V-22 Osprey vertical takeoff and landing transport aircraft in Okinawa.



The Okinawa prefectural assembly adopted in July a resolution calling for a review of the Japan-U.S. statement.

http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-168874-storytopic-53.html

「普天間」県内移設撤回求め決議 名護市議会2010年10月15日

  【名護】名護市議会(比嘉祐一会長)は15日の9月定例会最終本会議で、米軍普天間飛行場「県内移設の日米合意」の撤回を求める意見書と決議を17対9の賛成多数で可決した。同議会で名護市辺野古への移設に全面的に反対する決議が可決されるのは、1996年以来。

 移設に断固反対する稲嶺進名護市長に加え、市議会も反対の意志を明確にしたことで、政府が辺野古移設を推進するのは一層困難になりそうだ。

 意見書と決議では、辺野古移設を明記した5月28日の日米共同声明について、「県外移設を求める名護市民および県民の意志に沿うものではなく、民主主義を踏みにじる暴挙として、また県民を愚弄するものとして到底許されるものではない」と厳しく批判。

 「政府に対し名護市民、県民の総意を踏みにじる『県内移設の日米合意』に激しい怒りを込めて抗議し、その撤回を強く求める」としている。

 あて先は意見書は首相、外相、防衛相、内閣官房長官、沖縄担当相、衆参両議長、沖縄防衛局長、県知事など。決議は米大統領、駐日米国大使、米国務長官、米国防長官など。【琉球新報電子版】

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Vancouver Shinpo Report on the event with Linda Hoaglund 映画『安保』監督との会の報告 バンクーバー新報

Here is a report in October 7th issue of Vancouver Shinpo, a weekly Japanese-language newspaper in Vancouver, on the post-screening event on October 4th with Linda Hoaglund, director of film ANPO, featured in Vancouver International Film Festival.

See HERE for information of this film in English.

バンクーバーの週刊日本語新聞『バンクーバー新報』に掲載された、10月4日のリンダ・ホ―グランド監督(映画『安保』)を囲む会の記事です。

Sunday, October 10, 2010

Douglas Lummis on Smedley Butler, and Butler's "War is a Racket" speech

Here is an article about Smedley Butler (1881-1940), written by Douglas Lummis, a political scientist living in Okinawa.

The Great Smedley Butler

by Douglas Lummis

Shukan ST, 22 March, 2002

Smedley Butler
Among the many U.S military bases on Okinawa, there is one called CampButler. It was named after one of the most famous and colorful officers in U.S. Marine Corps history, Smedley D. Butler.

Smedley Butler joined the Marines in 1898 at the age of 16, in time to participate in the war in Cuba. (That was when the U.S. obtained its base at Guantanamo Bay.) From Cuba he was sent to the Philippines to help suppress the independence movement there.

In 1900 Butler was part of the multinational force sent by the Great Powers into China during the Boxer Rebellion. He was wounded twice, but recovered well enough to participate in the sacking of Beijing.

From there Butler's story is a history of the U.S. Marines in the first three decades of the 20th century. After China he was in Honduras, then Panama, then the Philippines again. In 1912 he helped rig elections to form a U.S.-friendly government in Nicaragua. In 1914 he entered Mexico as a spy to draw up plans for U.S. military intervention in the Mexican Revolution. (Later that year U.S. Marines ans sailors did land in Mexico and seize Vera Cruz, but with little effect on the revolution.)

The following year Butler was in Haiti, where he helped set up a U.S.-friendly puppet government and forced the adoption of a new constitution that had been written by U.S. government officials. And so on. Butler was awarded two Congressional Medals of Honor for heroism in combat.

Probably many of the Marines at Camp Butler and other Marine bases in Japan know these Smedley Butler stories. But I wonder how many know how he spent the last years of his life. After his retirement in 1931, at the rank of major general, Butler became a popular public speaker. And he began to think about what he had been doing. He decided that for most of his career he had been a "racketeer for capitalism."

In in 1935 he wrote, "I helped make Mexico . . . safe for American oil interest in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys . . . I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 1903. In China, in 1927, I helped to see to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested."

"Looking back on it," he continued, "I feel I might have given Al Capone a few hints. The best he could do was to operate his racket in three city districts. We Marines operated on three continents."

Butler did not become a pacifist, but he argued that the U.S.; military should be used for defense only, and should be withdrawn from all foreign countries.

When the Marine Corps gave his name to a base in Okinawa, what that ignorance or was it an intentional insult?

References:
Maverick Marine: General Smedley Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History by Hans Schmidt (The University Press of Kentucky, 1987); War is a Racket" by Smedley D Butler (Round Table Press,1935).


C. Douglas Lummis, a political scientist and a former US Marine stationed on Okinawa, is the author of Radical Democracy and other books in Japanese and English. A Japan Focus associate, he formerly taught at Tsuda College.

Here is Butler's speech re-created by an actor. 
 

Thursday, October 07, 2010

Peace Philosophy Salon with Gavan McCormack on October 16 ピース・フィロソフィー・サロンの案内 ガバン・マコーマックさんを迎えて

日本語の案内は下方をご覧ください。For notice in Japanese, scroll down.

Peace Philosophy Salon - Fall Special -


A special event by Peace Philosophy Centre and Vancouver Save Article 9


"The Battle of Okinawa 2010: Japan-US Relation at a Crossroad"

7 PM, Saturday, October 16

With special guest

Gavan McCormack

Professor Emeritus, Australian National University
Author of "Client State: Japan in the American Embrace"

 
@ Peace Philosophy Centre (Vancouver, BC - participants will be given a direction)

Photo by Chuck Overby
 Five decades after the adoption of the (revised) US-Japan Security Treaty, Cold War assumptions still underpin the relationship between Japan and the US. A belated Japanese attempt to reform the relationship in 2009-2010 ended in failure and the collapse of the Hatoyama government. Whether the Kan government can do better remains to be seen. The “Okinawa problem” has emerged as a crucial bone of contention between the two governments. 65 years after the Battle of Okinawa, Okinawans' anger towards the two governments have reached a peak. What are the implications of the now 14-year long attempt to resolve the Okinawan demand for closure and return of Futenma Marine base in Ginowan City?

- Free admission. Snack and drink donation welcome.
- RSVP and inquiry to info@peacephilosophy.com
(Detailed direction will be given to participants)

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor at Australian National University. A graduate of the universities of Melbourne and London , he joined the ANU in 1990 after teaching at the Universities of Leeds (UK), La Trobe (Melbourne), and Adelaide. He has also been Visiting Professor at many universities in Japan, where he has lived and worked on many occasions since first visiting it as a student in 1962. He was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Humanities of Australia in 1992. His work has been translated and published in Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Thai, Arabic, and the main European languages. His most recent book is Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, (Verso, 2007), of which Japanese, Korean, and Chinese editions were published by Gaifusha, Changbi, and Social Science Academic Press of China. He is the author of Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe. A media commentator on North-East Asia, he is a coordinator of Japan Focus. In 2008 and 2009, he contributed an invited monthly essay published in Korean to Kyunghyang Shinmun (Seoul). He is a regular visitor to Okinawa, and was convener in December 2009 of the "Nago Conference" held in Nago City, Okinawa, on "Civil Society and Social Movements in East Asia."

秋の特別ピース・フィロソフィー・サロンのご案内

「バンクーバー九条の会」との共催

スペシャルゲスト ガバン・マコーマックさん(オーストラリア国立大学名誉教授、『「属国」:米国の抱擁とアジアでの孤立』著者)を迎えて

「『沖縄戦』2010ー普天間『移設』問題と正念場の日米関係」

10月16日(土)午後7時から

バンクーバーのピース・フィロソフィー・センターにて(参加者に詳しい行き方を案内します)

安保改定から50年、「沖縄問題」で日米関係は岐路に立つ。2009年の政権交代に伴い、鳩山首相は冷戦構造を引きずったままの日米関係からの脱却を試みたが失敗に終わり、菅政権がこの問題にどう取り組んでいくのかは不透明なままだ。基地反対候補として当選した名護市の市長は「海にも陸にも作らせない」と宣言している。普天間飛行場を抱える宜野湾市の市長は新基地に反対し知事選に立候補した。沖縄戦65年、長年の抑圧に対する沖縄の怒りは頂点に達している。日本現代史第一人者のガバン・マコーマック氏が、こじれた普天間『移設』問題を読み解き、日米関係、東アジアにおけるこの問題の意義を語る。

★入場無料。
★参加申し込みと問い合わせは info@peacephilosophy.com  まで
★スナック、飲み物差し入れ歓迎。
★ガバンさんは英語日本語バイリンガルです。質問やコメントなど、日本語でできます
★会場の住所、行き方は申し込んだ人にメールで案内します。

ガバン・マコーマック プロフィール
オーストラリア国立大学名誉教授。1974年ロンドン大学博士号取得。日本と東アジアの政治、社会問題を歴史的視点で幅広く把握しようと研究を続けてきた。リーズ大学(英)、ラ・トローブ大学(豪)、アデレード大学(豪)で現代日本史および日中、日韓、日米関係を中心に教え、1990からオーストラリア国立大学アジア太平洋研究所教授。1962年の日本留学以来ほぼ毎年来日し、東京滞在時にはよく皇居の周りをジョギングする。オンライン誌「Japan Focus」のコーディネーターもつとめる。